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Multilingualism in Algeria: between ‘Soft Power’, ‘Arabisation’, 
‘Islamisation’, and ‘Globalisation’ 
Anissa Daoudi 
University of Birmingham 
Email: a.daoudi@Bham.ac.uk 
Abstract 
The language question in Algeria is far from a straightforward case and its 
complexity and multiplicity make it an original case to study due to the diversity 
of languages, its language politics in both the colonial and the postcolonial eras, 
and its tight relationship to different ideological movements, which still affect 
issues related to identity, religion and ethnicity. The distinction between the 
colonial and the postcolonial eras is a necessary step to understand the layers of 
complexity of its language policies and provide a context which helps explain the 
relationship between language politics and ‘soft power’, as theorised by Nye.  It 
also provides a timeframe for when one can start talking about ‘soft power’, in 
contrast to ‘hard power’ where the coloniser imposed its language by force (what 
is known as the Frenchification project). The article seeks firstly to challenge the 
Arabisation project in relation to Algeria and presents its close relationship to the 
Islamisation of the country through soft power practices. Secondly, it questions 
the traditional linguistic dichotomy between Classical Arabic and dialects by 
adding to them a new language variety, which appeared as a result of soft power 
through cultural globalisation. The concept is developed further to highlight the 
emergence of a ‘new literary genre’ which also challenges traditional discourses, 
linguistic rules and literary canons.  
Keywords 
Algeria, colonial, Postcolonial, language policy, multilingualism, soft power, Berber, e-
Arabic  
 
“To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture.”  
Frantz Fanon 
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Introduction 
Thinking of ‘soft power’, the overarching theme of this special section, in relation to the 
language question in Algeria brings to mind the postcolonial period, in contrast with 
‘hard power’ as Joseph Nye (2004) describes it, as a coercive approach that involves the 
use of military and/or economic power to influence or control the behaviour or interests 
of other states or political groups which is, in fact, characteristic of colonialism. For 
Nye, ‘hard power’ is the ability to change by force established ways of doing things. 
‘Soft power’, on the other hand, looks at ways of manipulating and indirectly 
influencing processes that lead to a change of decision without resorting to force.  This 
article argues against the Algerian official and popular discourse which idealises ‘the 
Arabisation project’, and instead presents it as one example of a ‘soft power’ practice, a 
critique of ideologies such as ‘Pan Arabism’, implemented without taking into 
consideration other existing languages such as Berber and French. Through a 
chronological review of Algerian history, the article demonstrates political and 
linguistic decisions and how they affected various discourses to date. It will then present 
a new variety of Arabic, emerging as a result of globalisation, which I call e-Arabic. 
This variety of language, I argue, is the outcome of cultural globalisation; another 
example of ‘soft power’ practice. The article aims to contest the hegemony of Standard 
Arabic in the written medium through highlighting a new genre (based on e-Arabic), 
which made its way into Arabic literature by completely breaking both writing and 
literary canons and conventions. The core of this ‘new writing genre’ is the breaking of 
rules (grammatical, lexical, and syntactical) and more importantly the defiance of the 
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myth about ‘the sacredness’ of the language (Daoudi 2011a, Daoudi and Murphy 
2011b). 
Theoretical context 
Arabic is considered by many of its speakers to be a holy language because it is 
the language of the holy Qur’an. The religiousness of Arabic and the traditional 
relationship between the language and Islam have always been a form of power, 
perpetuated and indoctrinated over the years. Niloofar Haeri, in her book Sacred 
Language, Ordinary People (2003) argues that in Egypt people feel that they are 
custodians of Standard Arabic (SA) rather than owners of it. The sacredness of the 
language is often brought forward in discussions about Arabic. 
This issue of holiness or sacredness of Arabic has been discussed for decades 
and is a controversial one today. Arab thinkers such as Al-Jābirī and Laroui have been 
marginalised for years because they challenge the sacredness of the language. For Al-
Jābirī (1991), Arabic is an anachronism which has been ‘mummified’ and is unable to 
absorb or express modern categories of thought. According to him, tradition is 
preserved by ‘ahistorical’ and ‘unimaginative’ language.  For him and for other radical 
Arab modernists, e.g., Laroui, the greatest need is to dismantle and rebuild Arabic, 
precisely because it is the bearer of a ‘rich intellectual and literary tradition’ rooted in 
the golden age of Islam (Abu Rabi’ 1996, 29). Al-Jābirī’s search is broader than 
language per se; he questions the structure of what he calls ‘Arab reason’. Making use 
of André Lalande’s concepts, he distinguishes between ‘constitutive reasoning’ (which 
Al-Jābirī calls in Arabic: ʿal-aql al-mukawwin), referring to the mental activity that 
creates knowledge, constructs meanings, and decides on rules and principles on the one 
hand and, on the other, ‘constituted reasoning’ (in Al-Jābirī’s terms in Arabic: al-ʿaql 
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al-mukawwan), referring to reason that is already constituted and which encompasses a 
whole repertoire, including the arts and sciences. Al-Jābirī attributes the regression of 
Arab reason over the last 600 years to its preoccupation with reproducing the old 
(constituted reasoning) rather than creating the new (Sabry 2010, 156).   
Similarly, Sharabi (1988) dismantles the language issue in the Arab world in 
general, starting with considering Classical Arabic as the medium of neo-patriarchal 
discourse in which ‘beliefs, concepts, substantive information, and self-knowledge 
(modes of self-understanding and self-relating) of neo-patriarchal culture get formulated 
and produced in the shape of discourse’. His argument is that the radical dichotomy 
between fuṣḥa (Classical Arabic) and the everyday colloquial language, known as 
‘āmmiya, does not end at one level only (one is seen as formal and the other as vulgar), 
but it goes beyond that to other levels. For Sharabi, the two varieties are in fact two 
different languages ‘structurally related but essentially different’ (Sharabi 1988, 84). 
The formal language (fuṣḥa) is considered a foreign language. More importantly, 
Sharabi argues that ‘a major implication of this rift has been the reinforcement of 
traditional social divisions and the concealment of material and class basis of cultural 
disparity: knowledge becomes a privileged possession, an instrument of power’ (85). 
The cultural gap between those who ‘master “Classical Arabic” and use it forcefully in 
public speaking bestows status and power, and by the same token the illiterate and semi-
literate are excluded from this power’. The literate language produces two types of 
discourse: ‘one expressed in the traditionalist (patriarchal) language of the sacred text, 
the other in the language of progressive (reformist or secular) ideologists… Though the 
two discourses and their linguistic modes may differ in form as well as content, they are 
not essentially antagonistic, for in both their agreements and their oppositions they share 
the same basic paradigm’(85).  Sharabi’s explanation of the language system explains 
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the link between Classical Arabic as the language of power and at the same time the 
language of religion (power) and that despite the two ideological perspectives between 
traditionalists and reformists (secular), there is no real distinction, as the two discourses 
are mediated through the same language (in other words, it is a superficial change). In 
fact, Pan-Arabist ideology utilised religion in the nation-state formation of Arab 
countries. It was seen as ‘the factor around which conceptualisations of the Arab nations 
can coalesce. In this context, the fact that Islam turned Arabic into the language of a 
vibrant culture, and led to the Arabisation of many communities, is a relevant factor in 
Arab-nation formation’ (Suleiman 2003, 141). In the following section, information 
technology is highlighted to show how globalisation forced language change globally, 
including the Arabic-speaking region. 
Information technology and the Internet revolution have put aside traditional 
views on language and created new dynamics globally, including in the Arab World. 
Language use on the Internet took and is still taking different innovative forms among 
Arabs, including Algerians (youth, government, elite, men and women, teachers, 
religious institutions, and ministers) in different languages (Standard Arabic, dialect, 
Berber, French and Hybrid language) and through different mediums (Facebook pages, 
blogs, YouTube, and many other forms), and forming new communities. This 
phenomenon, known as ‘computer-mediated communication’ (CMC), in relation to 
Arabic is the variety of language through which I challenge traditional views on 
language. My starting definition is that ‘e-Arabic is a variety of language used on the 
internet and mobile telephony. The basis of e-Arabic is both MSA and Arabic dialects. 
It allows the use of dialects in writing (something that was not permitted by 
traditionalists). It also borrows and adapts words from languages like English and 
French; it allows code switching and code mixing, and uses numbers to represent 
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missing sounds in French and English Alphabets. Additionally, it permits the use of 
Romanised Arabic. Furthermore, e-Arabic is not bound by the traditional syntactic, 
semantic and lexical rules, as one of its characteristics is “language distortion” in order 
to create “impact”, aiming to engage not only with the globalised discourse as such, but 
also to highlight the specific ways in which the local frames the global’ (Daoudi 2017: 
232). 
e-Arabic is a new variety created and maintained by Arab Internet users.  
Linguistically speaking, groups of Internet and IT users in the various Arabic-speaking 
regions have created what John Swales calls a ‘discourse community’, a term formed by 
analogy with the sociolinguistic term ‘speech community’. The former identifies 
regional groups that share linguistic norms and/or typical phonological, lexical, 
morphological and syntactic patterns. Swales (1990, 87) describes them as ‘groups that 
have goals or purposes, and use communication to achieve these goals’. In fact, 
Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) in Arabic allows distinguishing between a 
‘discourse community’, which uses e-Arabic, and a speech community. The concept of 
speech community (SC) was introduced by Labov (1963, 1966, 2001) referring to the 
most often cited and critiqued definition:  
[t]he speech community is not defined by any marked agreement in the use of 
language elements, so much as by participation in a set of shared norms; these 
norms may be observed in overt types of evaluative behaviour, and by the 
uniformity of abstract patterns of variation which are invariant in respect to 
particular levels of usage (Labov 1972, 120-1).  
Significant here is the idea that members of a SC do not necessarily have to 
speak the same way—they must simply share a set of evaluations about the speech of 
that community. A good example is the SC shared by IT users from North Africa, who 
7 
 
might mix Arabic with French, and the SC shared by IT users from the Middle East, 
where there might be a mixing of Arabic with English. The following section will 
provide understanding of the complex nature of the ‘language question’ in Algeria with 
Nye’s concept of soft power in mind. It will look at two distinct phases (colonial and 
postcolonial) as well as the status of various languages at different times. It will start 
with the Frenchification project (colonial), followed by the Arabisation (postcolonial) 
and its relation to other existing languages like Berber, French and English. 
Language and Power in Colonial and Postcolonial Algeria: Soft Power 
practices 
To understand the language question in Algeria, one needs to go back to the colonial 
era, which started as early as 1830, when ‘France established a host of political and 
administrative institutions to rule beyond its borders. These had significant effects on 
how people worked, lived, what they learned, and how they interacted with one another’ 
(Maamri 2009, 77). One major effect of colonisation in Algeria was the dislocation of 
language. The imposition of the French language meant not only segregation but also 
illiteracy for the great majority of Algerian people. This imposed language policy, 
known as the ‘Frenchification’ policy, had detrimental consequences on local languages 
like Arabic and Berber. French colonialism was not only the exploitation of the 
Algerian economy or its military, or political domination, but it was an annexation of 
the country.  This meant that it  was ‘l’Algérie Française’ for more than a century. To 
clarify, more than three generations were born under the French rule. The eradication of 
the language, religion or any component of the native identity was done automatically 
and any colonised native tended to be seen as Other.  Fanon states that the real Other for 
the white man is and will continue to be the black man (Fanon, 1967).  This created a 
hierarchy of power, social class, and race, and paved the way to tolerating all sorts of 
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tortures of the native. The colonised Algerian society was divided in a hierarchal way. 
The French legislator constructed identities according to religion and land of origin. The 
Algerian population was divided into ‘indigėnes Musulmans et indigènes Juifs, entre 
Français de souche et Européens’ (Carpenter Latiri, 2004). These divisions created 
social and economic hierarchies. 
Studies on the colonial policies in Algeria, including the language policy, are 
extensive (Maamri 2009; Benrabah 2007, 2013; McDougall 2006; and many others). 
For the purposes of this article, I will single out one important study, in which Ronald 
Judy (1997) discusses the relationship between language and politics, and language and 
power; including soft power.  Judy brings to light the decision of the FLN leaders 
regarding the Soummam Declaration (1956) in relation to the language issue. The 
declaration states that a fundamental objective of the revolution was the return of Arabic 
as the language of the Algerians. Interestingly, not only was the declaration written in 
French, but also, it did not ban French (107).  This idea could be explained in two parts. 
The first shows as Judy (107) states that ‘legitimating the elimination of difference as a 
means of attaining national unity’ was the motto of the Algerian revolution, led by the 
FLN (1954-1962). The motto goes back to Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben Baddis, founder of 
the Association of Algerian Ulama in 1931.  It claims ‘Islam is my religion, Arabic is 
my language and Algeria is my country’.  It was the unifying ideology that all Algerians 
felt the need to share under colonialism and from which the language is framed as being 
a factor towards achieving both the Islamisation as well as the Algerianisation of the 
country, as I will show in this paper. Judy adds that the ‘equation language plus culture 
equals community’ (Judy, 1997: 107) was justified then and was accepted as a necessity 
for that time and the circumstances of Algeria then. Here, the French language had been 
used as symbolic capital to engage with the global community in the fight for liberation. 
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French was viewed as a means of communication with other revolutionary movements 
in the world. The second part is related to Ben Bella’s first independent government’s 
decision to ‘temporarily’ maintain French and continue with bilingual education as 
being a necessity for Algeria to achieve rapid industrialisation.   
In Algeria, after independence in 1962, the country slipped into a battlefield of 
different nationalist and Islamist ideologies advocating the return to a strict Arab-
Muslim identity known as al-aṣala (i.e. authenticity).  In 1963, the first Algerian 
constitution declared Algeria a socialist state and established both Islam as the official 
religion and Arabic as the official language. In 1965 Colonel Haouri Boumediene led a 
coup d’état and became the new president of independent Algeria, in a time where there 
was much unrest. As a solution, he used radical nationalism in various activities 
including the cultural sphere to solve the legitimacy issue. The language question was a 
priority in the colonel’s agenda and drew its status from the linkage between Islam and 
nationalism (Benrabah 2013, 58). The Arabisation project was the soft way of 
legitimising the coup and framing it as being guided by Islamic ideals. While the 
discourse about the Arabisation project (discussed at length below), had the ingredients 
of success, in reality it became a central element of disunity. It started by marginalising 
the Berbers—the indigenous citizens of Algeria—as well as alienating the vast majority 
of Algerians who had a French education. French remained the only official language in 
Algeria for a while before being framed and narrated by revolutionary political rhetoric 
as the language of the enemy which should be eradicated.   
The Arabisation project placed a generation in ‘exile’ in their own country as 
French was seen as betraying the nationalist sentiment which was growing not only in 
Algeria but in the whole Arab region, known as Pan-Arab Nationalism. I use the word 
‘exile’ here to refer to the marginalisation, culture of exclusion, and the division 
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between French and Arabic speakers in a ‘struggle for power’ as to who will have 
access to posts. The struggle over power was disguised in different ways, such as 
presenting Arabisation as equal to Algerianisation. In other words, Francophone 
speakers were implicitly asked to conform to and adopt re-Algerianisation. McDougall 
(2017, 269) argues that ‘the regime’s rhetoric contributed to this framing of the 
language question as one of conflict between “authentic” and “inauthentic” culture, 
when in fact so-called francisants also—of course—spoke (dialectal) Arabic or 
Tamazight, and many Arabic speakers, most of whom were entirely monolingual, 
themselves had very ambivalent attitudes towards the French language and to norms 
deriving from French culture’. This means that the rhetoric relating to language in 
Algeria is mostly formulated by the state and in a way ‘artificial and imposed’, to 
borrow McDougall’s words (2011, 265). This imposed artificial rhetoric dominated the 
public sphere in Algeria and in many cases re-appeared in the 1980s in what is known 
as the ‘Berber Spring’ and later in the 1990s in the ‘Civil War’ by the Islamists who 
framed Arabic as the language of ‘Islam’ and French as the language of the ‘non-
believers’ and ‘Hizb Fransa’ (allies of France). The violence exercised on the Algerian 
French elite increased in the 1990s and is a good example of what Martin Thomas 
(2012) calls ‘cultural violence’. Some Francophone Algerian writers fought back and 
decided to write in the language of the coloniser as a way of resistance,  Kateb 
Yacine (1929-89) wrote that the French language was son butin de guerre (his spoil of 
war), Assia Djebar calls it a ‘paternal language’, and so on. This discourse about 
language continued to exist in Algeria, along with other discourse such as the Berber 
emancipation, use of the vernacular ʿāmmiya, Standard Arabic and its relation to Islam, 
and so on. 
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Interestingly, while bilingualism was a reality, the discourse about Arabic and its 
relationship to Islam and to the glorious past were in full swing. Also, while 
Francophonie was described as ‘neo-colonist’, serving imperialism, most of the 
Algerian elites educated their children in French schools. Statistically, ‘the French 
institutions provided instruction for 15,000 children of which 37% were Algerian’ 
(Benrabah 2013, 63).  This meant that most well paid jobs were given to the French-
educated children and those who were educated in Arabic (government) schools could 
not find jobs. The excuse for recruiting Francophones was that the new economy 
required competency in French. The French centres and schools (e.g. Lycée Français in 
Algiers) maintained a high quality of teaching compared with national schooling, which 
declined. One of the reasons for the decline goes back to the Arabisation project, for 
which the government had no prior planning, as well as the recruitment of Egyptian 
teachers who were of very low calibre. What was remarkable is that the leaders, who 
were ideologically committed to the Arabisation project, sent their children to French 
schools as a form of ‘cultural capital’, to use Bourdieu’s term (1991) and gave jobs to 
Francophone elite, which helped the formation of  what Benrabah calls ‘elite closure’.   
Influencing through education and language (soft power) is not complete 
without referring to another variable which is English, presented as the language of 
technology with no colonial baggage in Algeria. It could be put into a context of rivalry 
between English, as the world lingua franca, and French, as the ex-colonial language in 
North Africa. After independence, it was clear that French was going to stay, as the first 
mandatory foreign language in public schools. For example, an Algerian child starts 
learning French at the age of nine; three years after starting primary education. English 
is introduced in year nine; at the age of 15. For language planners, it is clear that 
English is becoming more dominant in the world and is a vehicle of modernity and 
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technological development. Another factor which is also in favour of English is that the 
latter is free from ex-colonial baggage. However, in practical terms as much as the 
French language holds bitter memories, it is not profitable (including for economic 
reasons) to switch to English, particularly for the Francophone elite.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, the Islamists, i.e. the pro-Arabisation lobby, pushed for English to replace 
French, which was seen as colonialist and imperialist. Again, when we analyse the 
linguistic situation in practical terms, despite the Ministry of Education’s decision to 
privilege English in 1999, it was found that over 73% of the parents favoured French as 
the first foreign language (Benrabah 2013). 
Arabisation Project in Algeria: soft power practice? 
Arabisation in Algeria in particular came as a strong reaction against French cultural 
and linguistic imperialism.  Algerian leaders of the War of Independence (1954-62) and 
successive governments committed themselves to reviving Arabic language and Islamic 
cultural values as the national components of Algerian identity.   The aim was to 
recover the language of their ancestors and to be part of the wider region of the Arab 
region (Middle East and North Africa, MENA region).  The following section will bring 
to light more complex issues related to Arabisation. In this article, I argue that the 
Arabisation project is a good example to illustrate the concept of soft power and at the 
same time show how the relationship between language and violence has been 
politicised. The Arabisation project was the way to push for Pan Arabism led by other 
Arab countries like Egypt and Syria. Nye (1990) defines soft power as ‘the ability of 
one country to shape the preferences of another, and to do so through attraction and 
influence, rather than coercion’. The Arab countries’ influence was seen in providing 
teachers, as mentioned earlier, and also offering scholarships to Algerians to create an 
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Arabophone elite to replace the Francophone one. This is also in line with the American 
sociologist Mills (1956), who shows how power relations are shaped and above all how 
decision making is reproduced by elites, noting ‘that individuals occupied particular 
positions of power within social, economic... and political institutions and formed a 
“power elite”.’ The decision to opt for Arabic was an example of ‘overt power’. 
Algerian students were sent to Arab countries like Iraq and Syria to learn Arabic and to 
be trained to hold key positions. One example is the Minister of Education Cherif 
Kharroubi, a Pan-Arabist Berber who was a graduate of Baghdad University and who 
went for complete Arabisation instead of what his predecessor Mustapha Lachref who 
promoted gradualism. 
The close relationship between Arabisation and Islamism has a long history in 
the Arab world. ‘The first, and most pervasive and lasting, response of the Arab 
patriarchal order, after being overwhelmed by Europe, was to take refuge in its religious 
tradition. Islam, as both an ideology and a model of social organisation, became the 
natural rallying point of resistance, as exemplified in the four classic political-religious 
uprisings against imperialist domination – of Abdul Qadir against France in Algeria’ 
(Sharabi 1988, 72).  Through propaganda (soft power) and references to a ‘glorious 
past’, the Islamisation of the country began. This relationship grew in the 1980s-1990s 
(Coffman 1992, cited by Benrabah, 2013). This collusion between Arabisation and 
Islamisation in Algeria was, as mentioned earlier, due to the lack of graduates in Arabic 
after independence, which led to the recruitment of graduates from Qur’anic schools in 
Egypt and other Arab countries, confusing the teaching of Qur’an with the teaching of 
Arabic. The traditional language they taught was one ‘designed to assure supremacy of 
the religious perspective and automatically to legitimate different or opposing positions’ 
(Sharabi 1988, 96).  Zahia Salhi, in a lecture at the London School of Economics , gives 
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a concrete example of when the government used Islamic propaganda promoting a 
return to Shari’a law, saying: ‘the question of language put aside, the other vital area 
where the Islamists pressed for radical changes is the Personal Status Law, with 
demands that targeted women’s civil rights condemning them to a status of minors for 
life’. 
The powerful rise of political Islam, as a direct use of soft power, intensified 
through the soft use of the new media (Internet, satellite channels like Al Jazeera and 
many other religious channels) and through the distribution of free books and cassettes 
preaching Wahhabi ideology.  The Islamisation of the country was embodied in the 
appearance of ‘a whole new mood dominating the public sphere which was fully 
occupied by bearded men wearing qamīs and sirwāl (such as worn in Afghanistan), 
while Islamist women wore a plethora of new Islamic veils (hijāb, niqāb, jilbāb, 
chador…) which were all alien to Algerian society’ (Salhi, ibid).  
 
Drawing on the same theory of soft power (Nye 1990), i.e. investing in the 
education of the elite, is one way of influencing policies, as this category of people (the 
elite) is the one that is most likely to take up higher positions in government and affect 
policy outcomes.  Arabisation and Pan-Arabism were not the only powers of influence 
in Algeria. France also wanted to maintain its power in Algeria through different 
programmes. Its soft power is seen in the number of bursaries given to Algerians to 
study at French universities, and also in the programmes taught in Algeria at for 
example the French Schools in Algiers (Lycée Descartes, later renamed after Cheikh 
Bouhamama). After independence, the French government maintained ‘Centres 
Culturels Français’ in most large cities and helped the French lycées, which were 
known for their high quality education. It was, as Ruedy, cited by Benrabah, 2013: 63) 
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states, easy for French-educated Algerians to find well-paid jobs in the emerging 
industrial sector, which required competency in French.  They managed to get 
influential state jobs and ‘reproduced the same attitudes to French language and culture 
as in France (110). The Berber elite was aware of the importance of the cultural capital 
and was also determined to combat the Arab-Muslim hegemony, and therefore went for 
French rather than Arabic. I argue in this paper that ‘soft power’ was introduced by the 
French, who had an interest in maintaining close ties with their ex-colony, but also it 
was exercised by pan-Arabists who were working towards maintaining the Arabo-
Muslim hegemony. The relationship between Islam and Arabic has been instrumental in 
many other newly-independent Arab countries and was used as propaganda to control 
the populations, including the Berbers. 
The discourse about Arabic reappeared in relation to Islam during President 
Chadli’s tenure (1980s). He intended to reverse Boumedienne’s policies in terms of 
socialism (1960s and 1970s). President Chadli maintained that Arabic is a fundamental 
element in the Algerian Arab Muslim identity, and started to give way to the Islamists 
who were persecuted during Boumedienne’s regime. Indeed, the Islamists’ influence 
increased in the 1980s, which meant that Arabic hegemony increased. This resulted in 
what is known as the ‘Berber Uprising’. The feeling of a lack of real opportunities for 
graduates of Arabic, the sentiment of French hegemony over the country, and the poor 
political and socio-economic conditions for the majority of the population helped to 
foment the riots in the Kabilya in the 1980s and the civil war in the 1990s. Berbers 
favoured French and called for the institutionalisation of colloquial Arabic. In fact, the 
way the Berberist movement acted towards Arabic is very similar to the way Arabo-
Islamic ideology functioned (in other words, the exclusion of the other). Unrest in 
Kabilya happened nearly every decade. In 2002, Berber became a national language 
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(Article 3 of the Constitution), but not yet an official language.  In the spring of the 
same year, the government established the Centre for Berber Language Planning and the 
National Pedagogic and Linguistic Centre for the Teaching of Berber in French in 
December 2004 (Benrabeh 2013, 69). It was considered a first step towards plurality by 
Algerians.  
The situation in Algeria had reached a deadlock in most areas (political, social, 
economic, etc.).  After the country had seen five heads of state, Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
(the current President) was brought to power. He was an ex-diplomat, who belongs to 
Boumedienne’s era. In public, the new President talked about the language question, 
saying: ‘it is unthinkable to … spend ten years studying pure sciences in Arabic when it 
would only take one year in English’ (Benrabah 2013).  This declaration admits the 
failure of the Arabisation project and adds a new ‘variable’ to the equation of language 
in Algeria, breaking away from the classic dichotomy of French and Arabic, (at least 
from the official side, because the Islamists had demanded the replacement of French 
with English earlier). The second thing is that the declaration shows encouragement of 
bilingualism. The latter has never ceased to exist.  Bouteflika himself is the perfect 
model for a bilingual President, and his bilingual attitude starts from his conviction of 
being a successful bilingual.  In another speech, he says: ‘for Algeria, I will speak 
French, Spanish, and English, and, if necessary, Hebrew’.  He adds: ‘let it be known 
that an uninhibited opening up to the other international languages… does not constitute 
perjury… This is the price we have to pay to modernise our identity’ (Benrabah 2013, 
76-77).   There are two important readings of Bouteflika’s speech. The first is the 
implicit declaration of the failure of the Arabisation project, which in turn is a failure of 
the transnational Arabisation project (another example of soft power). The second is an 
example of ‘soft power’ through the cultural influence of both the United States and the 
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United Kingdom by way of educational programmes. Related to it is the coded language 
of the President showing his move towards further cooperation in relation to economy, 
precisely the selling of shares of national oil company to these two countries (UK and 
US).   
By bringing up Hebrew as an extreme case, Bouteflika is also rejecting the 
‘blackmailing’ by those who link Arabic to Islam and to al-aṣala.  In reality, President 
Bouteflika never rejected French as a working language in Algeria. An example of the 
drastic measures taken by the president was when he set up the National Commission 
for Reform and Educational System (CNRSE in French) to look into the curriculum, 
textbooks, teacher training, and so on (making sure they are free from Islamic 
fanaticism). What Bouteflika really did was recycle the old colonial system and use the 
‘return of elite closure’ strategy. By recycling a strategy of old colonialism, I mean that 
the French never ‘contemplated democratising the acquisition of their language in 
independent Algeria. Immediately after 1962, they approved of elite bilingualism, and a 
horizontal diffusion of French: its spread was selective and only dominant groups could 
learn it and have real competency in it’ (Benrabah 2013, 110).  In other words, it is the 
‘elite closure’ strategy that would reproduce the same attitudes to French. Ms. 
Benghebrit, Minister of National Education, is a good example of a Francophone 
member of the elite heading one of the most difficult ministries in Algeria, despite 
opposing voices from Arabophones. Her speeches have been a source of mockery for 
her lack of proficiency in Standard Arabic due to her being native speaker of Berber, 
and also her French education. Having said that, Ms. Benghebrit has managed to 
challenge ‘old school’ discourses in relation to language by, for example, suggesting the 
use of Algerian dialect in schools in addition to Standard Arabic as well as teaching 
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Tamazight in most cities in Algeria (not restricting it to the Tamazight regions). The 
following section will take us to how Tamazight has developed in recent years. 
Berber, on the other hand, as one component of the ‘language question’ in 
Algeria is an example of ‘soft power’ and how it was sidelined through the Arabisation 
project. It went through different movements led by Berbers fighting for the return of 
their native language as an official one. The most recent constitutional amendments, 
which took place in February 2016, give full rights to the Berbers to have Tamazight 
language as a national and official language in Algeria. This action came to complement 
and comply with the Berber demands to have their language considered ‘official’ rather 
than ‘national’ as stated in Article 3 of the Constitution.  
Article 3: Arabic remains the national and official language of the State. A High 
Commission for the development of Arabic Language shall be created under the 
President.  
Article 3b. Tamazight is also a national and official language. The State shall work 
to promote and develop it in all of its linguistic variety used within the national 
territory. An Algerian Academy of the Amazigh Language shall be created, placed 
under the President of the Republic. 
 The Berber question is far from being resolved by issuing the above article.  
However, the decision to include Tamazight in the Assia Djebar prize for Best Fiction is 
a good sign.  This year, Algerian novelist Rachid Bouxerroub won the prize for his 
novel Tislit n’oughanim (The Bride of Reeds). The significance of the prize is important 
as it destroys the myth that Tamazight is an oral language that cannot be written down.   
Globalisation as means of soft power: the case of e-Arabic 
The hybrid language (e-Arabic) resulting from the information technology revolution 
has led to the emergence of a ‘new literary genre’ as a reality in the last decade. This 
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new genre, which is sometimes called ‘chick lit’ by critics and ‘the new resistance 
literature’ by others, is different in form and in genre from mainstream literature. It 
starts by distancing itself from ideology and by defying what is perceived as taboo, like 
religion, politics, and sex, known as ‘al-thālūth al-muḥarram’ (the forbidden triangle). 
This new genre managed to break the relationship between reader, publisher and critic, 
giving importance to the process through which the text is produced. The traditional 
relationship between the writer and the reader has left both of them isolated from each 
other and from the world they live in. The gap between them had been widened due to 
the elite’s monopoly of cultural and social spheres. In other words, there has been a 
democratisation of literature, which for decades used to be restricted to the elite who 
mastered the Standard language. The gap between the Arab elite and the rest of the 
population is wide and the relationship between the two is one of power. The new genre 
prioritises the personal sphere in order to engage in what really matters to the public. 
The opening of a new sphere created new dynamics that challenge notions of 
nationalism, replacing them with notions of ‘community’ (Judy 2016; Fanon 1963) and 
with global universal values (Nye 2004).  It managed to transcend the local, regional, 
and national to the global, giving space to marginalised youth, women, and people from 
ethnic groups to express their feelings and ideas through different platforms. It is this 
‘community’ which Judy (2016) based on what Fanon theorised as a society united not 
on a religious or ethnic basis, but united in their fight for freedom, using inventive 
language. The definition of e-Arabic, mentioned above, resonates with Fanon’s concept 
of a ‘new variety of language’, free from sacredness, from regionalism, and above all 
free from archaic rules. It is the ‘new’ language which believes in the human, in his 
capacity to change the world through communicating globally. It challenges the 
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centrality of Standard Arabic, linked to ideologies such as pan-Arabism or pan-
Islamism, it embodies the ‘new intelligent’ human (Judy 1997). In the following 
section, contextualisation of the ‘new variety’ of Arabic is provided.  
As mentioned earlier, a defining characteristic of this new language (e-Arabic) is 
its non-conformity with standard grammar. e-Arabic does not obey any ‘standard’ rule, 
in fact, it frequently ‘shocks’ the reader by ignoring and distorting grammatical ‘norms’ 
as well as addressing, as mentioned above, themes that have previously been considered 
taboo in a way that is accessible to the general public in the form of popular literature. I 
argue that e-Arabic coiners are, in fact, the users of ‘spontaneous grammar’, who chose 
to be distinct—to reference Bourdieu’s (1992) concept of ‘distinction’—from the 
mainstream users of Arabic. They coin new words composed from English/French, mix 
dialect with standard Arabic, and adapt borrowed words into Arabic. This implies that 
this power can also be exercised by using ‘spontaneous’ language, as it is the speaker 
who decides on what language to use and whom to address. Therefore, e-Arabic coiners 
are employing this new variety of language as a means of generating power (cultural 
capital).  
The notion of using Standard Arabic in writing is an institutionalised idea. 
Likewise, using the dialect for the spoken form is the norm, and anything which does 
not respect these two conventions is considered as ‘incorrect’ and uncanonical. This is 
not to say that dialect has never been used in literature. What is innovative, however, is 
the sole use of dialect as well as the mixing of languages throughout the writing. This 
new practice of writing is still controversial, despite being popular in terms of 
readership in the Arabic-speaking region. ‘Language is a means and not an end’ is the 
motto that is motivating a high number of young bloggers to write in order to be heard 
in countries where expression has been censored. The argument is that the standard 
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Arabic, the supposedly ‘high’ language, has been for a long time a stumbling block for 
the vast majority of Arabic native speakers, and is monopolised by a minority of the 
elite population. The same argument was once advocated by nationalist leftist 
movements, promoting the social mission of literature to narrow the gap between the 
élite (bourgeois) and the mass population (Azam 2009). However, what was intended 
then was to encourage writers to interact with the mass population by using a simple 
language and stepping down from the ‘ivory towers’ to write about what preoccupies 
these people. It did not mean writing in colloquial ways, as this option was not 
available.  
A special edition of Al-Majalla al ‘Arabiyah (2009), reported on this new 
writing phenomenon. Writers from around the Arab world expressed their views about a 
new phenomenon which they called The Internet Storyteller. Their views varied 
between those who found this form of writing amusing and an addition to what is being 
written in MSA, and those who viewed this genre as a temporary phase which would 
fade out in the future, as it is not based on solid ground. The new trend of writing is not 
restricted to Arabic, and studies have focused on the effects of computer-based writing 
as opposed to earlier forms of written language production.  Schmitz (cited by 
Androutsopoulos 2011) distinguishes between four levels at which CMC has affected 
the nature of writing: (a) monologic (computer-writing enabling flexible composition 
techniques and a less disciplined and uninhibited style of writing, which is one of the 
characteristics of young Arab writers using e-Arabic, as it frees them from centuries of 
institutionalised rules); (b) dialogic (a new writing style emerging in sites of public, 
anonymous participation, a ‘playful anarchy’ of hybrid, spoken/written patterns), a good 
example of this category is Banāt al-Riyaḍ [Girls of Riyadh] (2005); (c) non-linear 
(hypertext as a new principle of information structure); and (d) interactive 
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(collaborative writing and the fuzzy distinction between author and reader) 
(Androutsopoulos 2011, 4). This interactive approach is adopted by Ahlem 
Mosteghanemi, a prominent Algerian writer, whose book mixes Arabic and English in 
its very title: Nisyān.com [Forgetting.com] which includes a website for readers to 
comment on the book, enabling both the readers and the writer to exchange ideas and 
interact with each other. This privilege is made available via the virtual sphere. The 
book is also accompanied by a CD, aiming to support and reinforce the theme of the 
novel, which is forgetting and moving on in life. Mosteghanemi dedicated her novel 
Nisyān. Com (2009) to her ‘hackers’, praising them for reading her work: 
 [I dedicate this book firstly to the hackers of my books. I don’t know anybody who 
waits for my publications as much as they do] (7, translated by author). 
Arabised words are found not at the word level, for example misājāt [messages] 
(88) but also at the phrase level, including at the figurative level such qiṭaṭ al-nit 
[internet cats] (88).  The use of Algerian dialect is also present such as Allah yaj’alnī 
ghāba wa al-nās fiya ḥaṭṭaba [lit, I pray to God to make me into a forest so that people 
can come and take wood from it, meaning, I wish I can be of help to people] (7). In an 
interview conducted for this article on 26 September 2016, she replied to the question 
whether she thinks her later novels can be considered as ‘chick lit’, saying: ‘I don’t 
believe in the divisions of literature. I think I am playing a role that none of the Arab 
writers has done before. I run a website which has more than ten million subscribers and 
I have brought back the culture of “reading”… I interact with what they write… I think 
I am helping them become writers.’  
As far as electronic writing is concerned, the most recent controversial case is 
that of a young blogger Anwar Rahmani, who was summoned by the Algerian police on 
the 27th February 2017 for supposedly writing an ‘outrage against God’ and also for 
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‘challenging’ the sacredness of the ‘Moudjahid’ [war veteran]. The accusations are 
based on the beliefs of a fictional character; a homeless man who believes he is a god in 
Rahmani’s novel in Arabic The City of White Shadows.  Also, the character is a gay 
Algerian pied noir called Jean Pierre, a reference to the Algerian French writer and 
‘Moudjahid’ [war veteran] Jean Sénac. The electronic novel was published online by 
the writer after he failed to convince publishers to accept it. Rahmani uses the internet 
as an outlet to engage with other Arab as well as global bloggers, using YouTube videos 
to summarise his novel and enhances the text with pictures and music. As far as his 
language is concerned, the use of Standard Arabic does not necessarily mean good 
mastering of the language, as there are few spelling mistakes that could be due to the 
influence of the Algerian dialect.  For example, the use of the expression yudhrim al-
nār with a /dh/ [set fire], should be yuḍrim al-nār  with a /ḍ/.  This confusion is 
common in Algerian dialect (particularly in Algiers region).`  What is common among 
Arab bloggers’ writings, as mentioned above, is their defiance of what is perceived as 
taboo, like religion, politics. The accuracy of the language in terms of grammar and 
spelling are the least of their preoccupations, as they perceive their role as bigger. 
Rahmani says: ‘I want to “correct” Algerian history by bringing to light a “softer” 
version about our revolution, which had always been portrayed as bloody and violent’ 
(Rahmani, 2016) not in bibliography.  The combination of shocking the Algerian 
society by highlighting homosexuality and at the same time challenging the symbolic 
image of the ‘Moudjahid’ as ‘sacred’ are what makes the novel controversial, to say the 
least. 
In Rahmani’s blog, topics like announcing the engagement of a gay couple in 
the city centre of Algiers is one example of how challenging if not impossible for gay to 
live in Algeria.  Another very interesting text is entitled ‘Usht balla… blā rabbik 
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muslim’ [shut up… you are a Muslim, with or without your consent (used as a curse)], 
where he uses the Algerian dialect to report the incident of detention at the police 
station. He uses the officer’s swearing to criticise ‘the Algerian Islamisation’, which 
followed the 1990s ‘Black Decade’ and more importantly, he criticises the double 
discourse in Algeria. In another post entitled ‘Jinirāl Tawfīq: hal kān ḥāmī al-ḥurriyāt 
al-dīniyya fī al-Jazā’ir?’ [General Toufiq: was he the protector of religious and 
intellectual freedoms in Algeria?]. He asks questions about the controversial General 
Toufik1, who is known to be tough against the Islamists and the possibility of links 
between his arrests and the clampdown on liberal intellectuals. These controversial 
themes are the core of his writings, which would not have been possible were it not for 
the emergence of the Internet. The latter makes a good case for how cultural 
globalisation is used as ‘soft power’ to challenge and change discourse and societies 
(Nye 2004).  Rahmani’s extensive use of Algerian dialect can be explained by his 
awareness of the importance of language, in this case, Algerian dialect as ‘soft power’ 
to communicate taboo themes. His target audience is the local LGBT community, as 
well as a wider global readership. The discourse on writing in the dialect is the content 
of the following section. 
As mentioned above, one aspect of literature in e-Arabic is writing in dialect, 
which is different from the dominant practice of writing in Standard Arabic and 
including dialogues in dialect for more authenticity. Writing a complete novel in dialect 
is what is new and innovative in this genre. In Algeria, Merzak Baktache’s novel (2000) 
Khūya Daḥman [Brother Dehmane] is one of the first novels to be written entirely in 
                                                 
1 General Mohamed Mediène, also known as Toufik, was head of the Algerian secret services, the 
Intelligence and Security Department (Département du renseignement et de la sécurité, DRS), from 
1990 to 2015.  He was described as the world's longest serving "intelligence chief". 
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Algerian Arabic. Baktache is a writer who was given the title of ‘Arabic language 
protector/safeguard’ for his writings in Standard Arabic.  His experience of writing in 
Algerian dialect is not due to lack of proficiency in the Standard Arabic, but is an 
informed decision to use Algerian popular culture in a literary context. In an interview 
conducted on 6 May 2008, he said: 
 [When I search for the language, I search for the Human and the novel in our epoch is 
freedom.  We (Arabs) stayed behind in this field (literature) despite the fact that we are 
the first to write the novel]. 
Mezrak Baktache represents a clear case of multilingualism in Algerian. His 
mother tongues are Tamazight and Arabic. He also writes in French as well as in 
Arabic. The experience of writing in Algerian dialect does not adhere to the traditional 
‘Mashriqi’ discourse of writing in Standard Arabic or dialect.  It is not similar to the 
new wave of writing, which is out of blogs and websites. It is a reaction to the constant 
dynamic discourse on language in Algeria. For Baktache, language is not as important 
as the human and his/her longing for freedom. It is a means and not an end in its own 
right. His stance is in line with Fanon’s ‘intelligent’ language that does not take into 
consideration ethnicity or religion but invests in the Human and his fight for freedom.   
Fadhila Al Farouq is another Algerian writer who goes beyond the binary of 
Standard and dialect to write in a distinctive language which mixes Standard Arabic 
with Berber, French, and dialects from various Arab regions. In her novel Mizāj 
murāhiqa [Mood of a teenager] (2007). Al Farouq controls the language of the novel 
according to its characters in a harmonious way. The novel takes place in Ariss (a 
Berber village) in the Eastern part of Algeria where Louisa, the main character, lives 
under her uncles’ authority due to the absence of her father, who emigrated to France. 
For narrative purposes, the author used Standard Arabic in its different registers, from a 
religious language (Classical Arabic) for example, ‘wa lā tulmizū anfusakom’ [And do 
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not insult one another and do not call each other by [offensive] nicknames], ‘wa mā 
ūtīmtom mina al-’ilm illa qalīlan’  [And they ask you (O Mohamed)… And of 
knowledge, you (mankind) have been given only a little]. She uses historical language 
which reflects the rise of Islamism and the first killings of civilians by fundamentalist 
armed groups (1990s). She chronologically narrates President Chadli’s era, followed by 
President Boudiaf and his assassination (126). Al Farouq concentrates on the 
assassinations of Algerian intellectuals (148). She also uses Algerian dialect (songs and 
proverbs), for example she says: ‘’illī fātik bi līla fātik bi hīla’ [Miss a night and you 
miss a trick] (38). In addition, daily Algerian language is used in the spontaneous way 
of ordinary people in ordinary families (from Chaouiya or from Constantine).  The 
author presents the Algerian dialect as it is used in daily use, by highlighting its use of 
French, for example on page 84, she writes: 
ḥidhā’ al-rajul shakhṣiyyatuhu. Unẓurī ilā ḥidhā’ihi. 
 La classe ـ   
yabdū fi’lan kadhālika. Innahu rajul rafī’ al-dhawq. Bidūn ‘uqad, yuḥib kull al-
nās. 
.(.ṭabī’ī)...C’est normal  ـ  
Amīra amīra? 
(Ajnabiyya)  étrangėre biṣṣaḥ… Yāḥāynik …  Princesse  ـ  
(ghrībah gāwriyyah)    
 
[Man’s shoes are his personality, he is a classy man, with no complex, he loves 
everybody] 
[That is normal…] 
[Princess, princess?] 
[Princess, little do you know, …but a foreigner]. (84) 
 
The author uses local songs (from Algiers popular songs) like: ‘Yā al-rāyiḥ wīn 
msāfir trūḥ ta’ya w twallī [you who is travelling, you will one day return]’ (154), and 
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French was widely present in the novel, for example when referring to titles of films: 
‘Les Oiseaux se cachent pour mourir [Birds hide to die]’ (217). Tamazight is also 
among the languages used, given that Al-Farouq is Berber and her mother tongue is 
Chaoui2, for example, (2) ‘Yā Nānna ikkar sūkrwār āj yūdhān ādh ‘addān’ [Gran, move 
away from the corridor and let people pass], Chaoui is used when talking to her 
Grandmother who does not necessarily know Arabic. Another example is when her 
Grandmother replies ‘Āsh hūlādhī īnitās īīqīl’ [My kids, please tell him to leave me 
alone] (27). From the examples extracted from the novel, it becomes clear that Al 
Farouq does not shy away from using this mosaic of languages.  In a recent interview 
for this article conducted on 5 March 2017, she said: ‘Algeria is multilingual and 
multicultural and that is why we (as Algerians) should celebrate its diversity. Also, 
Algeria is a wide country and each region has its own dialect, nuances and its 
characteristics and this is why the writer cannot sound convincing if all characters speak 
in a similar way’.  She adds: ‘My writing has been influenced by Tahar Watar, whose 
mother tongues are Chaoui and Arabic.  In his writing, for example, Urs baghl [Mule’s 
Wedding] (1983), he celebrates Algerian languages’.   
Kamel Daoud, a Francophone journalist and a writer was called by an Imam an 
‘apostate’ and a ‘Zionist’ for declaring his identity to be ‘Algerian Muslim’ and not 
‘Arab Muslim’. This Imam issued a Fatwa for the killing of Daoud in 2015. In an 
interview3, when asked about the ‘language question’ in Algeria, he said: 
‘En Algérie, l’essentiel parle en algérien: le peuple, l’argent, les publicités, 
l’amour et la colère. Le reste est donc artifice: l’ENTV, Bouteflika, le régime, les imams, 
les “assimilés”, les islamistes. Tous ceux qui veulent que l’Algérie s’enrichisse, s’aime ou 
s’en sorte, parlent en algérien. Tous ceux qui veulent la posséder, la voler, la détruire, la 
nier ou lui marcher dessus, parlent en arabe classique. Ils sont une minorité dominante. 
L’algérien est une majorité dominée… Quand on vous dit que c’est un dialecte, c’est 
qu’on vous dit que vous n’êtes pas citoyen.’ 
                                                 
2 Chaoui is the Berber language used in the Eastern part of Algeria. 
3 Kamel Daoudi: http://www.algerie-focus.com/2013/06/djazairi-le-manifeste-de-ma-langue-
par-kamel-daoud/ 
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when asked about the ‘language question’ in Algeria, he said:   
‘In Algeria, the majority of people speak Algerian: the people, the money, the 
ads, love, and anger. The rest, then, is artificial: ENTV, Bouteflika, the regime, the 
imams, the “assimilated”, the Islamists. All those who want Algeria to prosper, to love 
itself, or to get through, speak Algerian.  All those who want to possess it, to steal it, to 
destroy it, to deny it, speak Classical Arabic. They are a dominant minority. Algerian is a 
dominated majority… When they tell you it's a dialect, what they're saying is that you're 
not a citizen’.  
Kamel Daoud and many others, as mentioned above, believe that Algerian 
dialect is in fact a language in its own right. Assia Djebar denounced ‘monolingual’ 
Algeria, which the Islamists promoted in the 1990s. In Fanon’s terms, the ‘Algerian-
ness’ here does not necessarily mean ‘nationalism’ but rather refers to a unifying 
language and culture that celebrates diversity and goes beyond religion and ethnicity 
and is positively acclaimed, in what Fanon calls ‘the intelligent language’.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Although the so-called Arab Spring did not take place in Algeria, the vast majority of 
Algerians (including the elites) when asked why they did not show any sign of revolt, 
respond that they did have their own ‘unnoticed’ revolution, which lasted a decade. 
They feel that they have been let down by their fellow Arabs and no country offered to 
help. The atrocities seen in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Egypt have been appropriated to 
remind Algerians of their ‘revolution’ to which the whole world turned a blind eye. 
McAllister (2013)  critically looks at ‘the assumptions that fears of a return to the 
violent 1990s are defining reticence towards revolution in Algeria’ and suggests that 
‘the riots of October 1988 provide a more useful reference point for understanding the 
clear lack of enthusiasm for a home-grown Arab Spring’ (McAllister 2013). 
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This article has argued that the ‘language question’ has been present throughout 
modern Algerian history, from the Arabisation project in the 70s, the Berber Spring in 
the 80s, the Black Decade in the 90s, up to the present. The language question has been 
used as ‘soft power’ throughout the postcolonial era and the Arabisation project 
represents one example of that. The article has drawn on Joseph Nye’s theory of ‘soft 
power’ to show how the Arabisation project was framed as the nationally unifying 
ideology after independence.  The Arabisation project in Algeria was also supported by 
the transnational Arabisation mediated through ‘imported’ curricula taught by 
‘imported’ Arab teachers, who supported Pan-Arabist ideology and at the same time 
influenced ‘political Islamic ideologies’.  Satellite TV channels such as al-Jazeera 
(Qatar) reinforced the link between pan-Arabism, Arabisation, and Islamisation of 
society. Other international agencies, such as UNESCO, the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation, and ISESCO also pushed towards linguistic change.   
Information technology, in this article, is used as the most effective example of 
‘soft power’ practice. It is used to highlight the emergence of a ‘new literary’ genre, 
which takes e-Arabic as a medium. It also presents the Internet as another example of 
‘soft power’ related to cultural globalisation. The concept of e-Arabic is used to 
highlight the impact of the Internet on the ‘youth’, as a form of ‘soft power’. Anwar 
Rahmani’s case demonstrates how ‘local’ bloggers communicate with the ‘global’ 
world on issues that have different resonances. Rahmani fits the characteristics of the 
‘new literary’ genre in terms of theme and use of the Internet as an outlet.  The ‘new 
literary’ genre is still considered as controversial despite its widespread use and its 
success in terms of the readers and reprints.     
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